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INTRODUCTION.
Of all branches of the law there is probably not one
in which judicial legislation has been more vigorously indulg-
ed than in the construction and application of the statute
of frauds, which to the ordinary mind seems so plain as to
be incapable of misconstruction. The amount of litigat-
ion arising under it has been enormous and the number of cases
which have been before the courts for decision can hardly be
computed, and now, after the lapse of two centuries since
its enactment many questions pertaining to it are not definit-
ly spttled.
The parliment of the Mother country enacted this im-
portant statute, entitled,
potat ttueetile "An Act for the Prevention of Fraudl§
and Perjuries" just one hundred years prior to the Declarat-
ion of our National Independence. It is quite unknown
outside of the British Empire and the United States.
It oripginated in the earnest desire of eminent Eng-
lish jurists, principal among the number, Lord Hale, to pre-
vent the numerous frauds and perjuries which were perpretated
2by means of suborned and perjured witnesses; the most effect-
ual way of doing this was to require a large number of the
most corinon contracts to be reduced to writing and siged by
the party whom it sought to charge.
The principle obleot of the statute was to. exclude
oral testimony in certain cases where experience had shown
that it was peculiarly liable to abuse. At the time
when the statute went into gation there was no rule of the
cormon law requiring any executory contract to be manifested
by a writing or any other evidence than that of mere words.
Professor Greenleaf says, (Greenleaf on Evidence),
' This statute introduced no new princip3b into the law; it
was new in England only. in the mode of proof which it requir-
dd. Some protective regulations may be foumd in some of the
early codes of most of the Northerfi nations as well as in the
laws it the Anglo Saxon princes. In the Anglo Saxon law,
such regulations were quite familiar and the statute of
frauds was merely the revival of absolute provisions deman-
ded by the circumstances of the times and adoptes in a new
mode. of proof to the conditions and habits of the trading
community. The statute l eft the common law untouched in
all respects except where it expressely provided a different
3rule. '
It has always been doubted by wise lawyers and
judges whether this statute has not caused and protected as
many frauds as it has prevented. But the same reasons which
led to its enactment has always produced a prevailing belief
that on the whole it is useful.
The 17th. section of the statute of frauds is in
the following words: 'And be it enacted that from and after
the said four and twentieth day of June A.D. 1677; no contract
for the sale of any goods, wares and merchandizes, for the
price of IOJ or upwards shallfallowed to be good except the
buyer shall accept part of the goods so sold and actually
receive the same, or give something in earnest to bind the
bargain or in part payment, or that some note or memorandum
in writing, of the said bargain be made and signed by the par-
ties to be charged by such contracts or their agents there-
unto lawfully authorized.'
With only slight amendments this statute has been
enacted in all of our states with perhaps one or two except-
ions. It caine subsequently to the settlement of the earlier
American colonies, therefore it was not adopted as part of the
common law but most of the states have patterned after it
4and have ,in substance enacted the same statute.
MEMORANDUM.
Its Form.
The 'form in which tie memorandum it. ,written is imnmat-
erial providing it contains all the requisite elements of a
contract. Any in strument which describes the property
sold, the price to be paid therefor, if the price has been
agreed upon, the parties and the essential terms of the
agreement,either by its own terms or by reference to other
writings, if the reference is so clear that it will not be
necessary to have recourse to parol evidence to explain or
establish itis as valid and binding as the most formal in-
strument which could be constructed. It is not necessary
that the memorandum should be contemporaneous with the con-
tract but it is sufficient if it has been made at any time
afterwards and then,anything under the hand of the party
.sought~'to be charged admitting that he had entered into the
6agrement will be sufficient to satisfy the statute, which
was only intended to protect parties from having parol agree-
ments imposed upon them. The statute does not require the
contract itself shall be in writing but that it shall be
evidenced by a writing under the hand of the party to be
charged.
The courttsaid in Townsend v. Hargraves, 118 Mass.
325,' The purpose of this celebrated enactment as declared
in the-preamble and gathered from all its provisions, is to
prevent fraud5,and falsehood by requiring a party who seeks to
enforce an oral contract in courtto produce as additional
evidence some written memorandum signed by the party sought
to be charged, or proof of somd act confirmatory of the con-
tract relied on. It does nt prohibit such contract. It
does.not declare that it shall be void or illegal unless
certain formalities are observed. If executed the effect of
its performance on the rights of the parties is not changed
and the consideration may be recovered.'
In Bailey v. Ogden 3 John. 399 an entrywas made by
the vendor of sugars inhis book of sales,of the name of the
purchaser and the terms of the cmtract of sale,which was
read~to the ag.ent of the vendee who made the purchase and as-
6sented to by him as correct. This was held not to be a suf-
ficient memorandum in writing, it not being signed by the
party to be charged.
Kent, Chancellor said,'The form of the memorandum of
the bargain is not material but it must state the contract
with reasonable certain ty, so that,the substance of it can
be understood from the writing itself without having recourse
to parol pro0f.'
Consideration.
In Wain v. Walters 5 East I0. which was a promise
to pay the debt of a thi*d personibut where the consideration
for the pronise was not stated in writing ,ib was held that
parol proof of the consideration was inadmissible under the
statute and the promise was therefore void. The American
authorities are out of harmony as to the necessity (.,of ex-
pressing the consideration. The statutes of some states
require that the consideration be expressed in the note or
memorandum of sale whi]e in others it specially provides that
it need not be expressed. The courts of New York previous
to .the ameniment of the statute in 1863 which struck out the
clause requiring the consideration to be expressed, ruled
7that the memorandum must+ contain the whole a-rrement and all
its material terms and conditions and followed the case of
Wain v. WAlters . But the chanpe of 1863 has given rise to
a new question and bred in the courts a wide difference of
opinion.
In Speyers v. Lambert 6 Abb. N.S. the General Term
held, that the amendment had the effect to make it wholly
unecessary for any statement of the consideration.
The contrary was held in Castile v. Beardsely 10 Hun 343.
Thus the law in New York state awaits the action of the
Court of Appeals for a final determination of this point.
Judge Finch argues in Drake v. Seaman 97 N.Y. '
that the amendment of 1863 had the *ff~ct of restoring the
law as it was before the words were inserted and that the con-
sideration must appear in the agreement. If we were to
judge from the dictum in this case.,we could easily conclude
what would be the final decision of the court upon the this
point,but a better and more logical conclusion would seem to
be, that the legislature whenit enacted this statute intended
to embody the whole common law on the subject of considerat-.
ion, as it existed, in the statute and the result of the amend-
ment of 1863 was to repeal the lause requiring the consid-
8eration to be expressed,which rbeat had the effect to ab-
rogate the law as it previously existed under the statute and
not to restore it.,as it existed in Wain v. Walters.
It may be stated as a general rule that unless the
statute expressely requires ft no consideration need be ex.
pressed in the memorandum of salJ.
Price.
If any price is actually agreed uponwhen the verbal
contract is entered into mid it is of the essence of the con,
tractit must be embodied in the memorandum but if the verbal
contract is silent as to the price then it is not necessary,
that Lt should be stated in the memorandum. A contract pro-
viding that the price shall be fixed by appraisers or any
other method will be sufficient.
In Hoadley v. M'Laie the defendant gave plaintiff
an order for a handsome laudulet. Nothing was said about
the price. Tindal Ch. J. said,'This is a contract which is
silent as to price and the parties therefore leave it to the
law to ascertain what~ the commodity cont±'acted foris reason-
ably worth' Parke J. said,'It is only necessary that price
should be mentioned when price is one of the ingred±ents of
9the bargain and it is admitted on all hands that if a specif-
ic price be agreed on, and that price is omitted in the mem-
orandum, it is insufficient.'
Parties to the Agreeme t..
In order that there may be a binding contract it is
recessary~that both buyer and seller should be noned or suf-
ficiently described in the instrument. If the writing shows
by'description with whom the bargain was made then the stat-
ute is'satisfied and(Iparol evidence is admissible to supply
the description. Iff one party is not designated at all
plainly the whole contract is not in writing for it'1akes two
to make a bargain .'
In Champion v. Plummer 3 B.&P. 252 the plaintiff by
his agent wrote down in a memorandum bookIthe terms of the
sale to him by the defendant, and the defendant signed he
writing but the words were sirply Bought of W, Plumnmer &c'
with no name of the person who bought. Sir Mansfield C.J.
said, ' Fowthat be said to be a contr'act_ or memorandum of a
contract which does not state who are the contracting parti-
es? By this note it does not at all apear to whom t he
gods were sold. It would proove a sale to any other pers-
IO
on r3as well as to the plaintiff.'
Subj ect Matter.
The sukject matter of the contract,or in other words.
the namp of the article of salemust be sufficiently stated
in the memorandum that the prdperty may be identified with-
out thr aid from parol evidence. A reference may be made
to other papers, which if taken together, render the d eseript-
ion clear nd definite will suffice. It is not necessary
that the agreement should contain a very accura+.e descriptio"n
of the property to be sold, as parol evidence is admissible
to identify it where the note or memorandu m contains suf-
ficient data to apply the description to the subject matter.
If it does not contain either in itself or by reference to
some other writing the means of identifying the property,
it is insufficient.
In Clark v. Chamberlain 102 Mass. lo4, the memorand
un of sale sirply described the land as lots nunber one and
to MortonJsai,' The isuperabe deficiency in the
plaintiff's case is that the memorandum in writin g does not
contain a description of the p remisos sold to sufficiently
satisfy the statute o f frauds. It does not in itself or
II
by reference to other writings contain the means of identify-
inathe premisres. Itshows that the defendantogreed to purch-
ase a part of a large tract of lani owned by the plaintiff
but furn ishes no means of determining what or how large a
part.
Credit.
All,. the terms and conditions of the contract must
,Wear in the memorandum. If there is a reference to other
papers which containg the terms of the contract and the ref-
erence is so clear that the whole contract, can be ascertain-
edwithout the aid of extrinsic evidence in explanation the
memorandum is sufficient.
In O'Donnell V. Leeman 43 Maine 158, the defendant
sold a dwelling house to the plaintiff at auction, upon
certain specified terms snd conditions. According to the
alleged contract the price to be paid was01200. one third
cash down, and the residue in equal payments in and one and
two years. The memorandum of sale failed to state the
t~rms of payment. It was attempted at the trail to show
the terms of ,paymnent by the introduction of cer t ain handbills
ad newspaper notic es, which were exhibited at the time of
12
the sale. It was held that where no terms of payment are
stated in a contract the money must be paid in a reasonable
time.
Collateral Papers.
The memorandum may consist of several papers as
well as one and if they contain the complete ",bargain they
form together such a memorandum as will satisfy the statute.
In such a case the papersAhave a clear reference to one
ahother , in order that the court may construe all of them
together without the aid of extrinsic evidence.
In Western UNion Tel. Co. V. Chicago & c R.R.CO.
86 Ill. 246, a written contract existed between the parties
for the building and operating of a telegraph line, the mem-
orandum was signed by the telegraph company and a copy of it
sent to the rrail road company, which accepted it by a letter
of it s agent but did not sign the contract. Held that the
letter of acceptance in which the contract was clearly referr
ed to showed the assent, and hat the contract wa complete
w ithbin the statute.
In Talman V. Franklin 14 N.Y. 584. it was held that
a document was made a part of a memorandum by being' fastenedt
'3
to it by a pin.
But if it be necessary to adduce parol evidence in
order to connect a siped paper with others then the several
papers do not constitute a memorandum in writing of the bar-
gain so as to satisfy the statute. If the reference is
smbigous parol evidence will be admitted to explain the oibig-
tity.
In Lonp V. Miller 4 C.P. 450. Thesiger, J.' said,
'When it i proposed to proove theexistence of a contract by
several documents it must appear upon the face of theinstru-
mont aigned by the party to be charged, that reference is
made to another document and thi omission cannot be supplied
by verbal evidence. If however0 it appears from the instru-m
ment that another document is referred to that document may
be identified by verbal evidence. A simple illustration of
this rule is given in Ridgeway V. Horton; there instructions
were referred to; now instructions may be either written or
verbal; but it was held that parol evidence might be adduced
to show that certain instr'uctions in writting were intended.
This rule of interpretation is merely a particular application
as to atent~ambiuity.'
• The authorities are harmonious in maintaining these
14
principles.
Letters to a Third Person.
The note or memorandum required by the statute
need not pass between the parties hit may be addressed to a
third person. If it can be distinctly ascertained from the
written communications without the aid of oral evidence what
are the terms of the contract, the memorandum will be-suffic-
ient to satisfy the statute.
In Gibson V. Holland I C.P. I, plaintiff was a horse
ck.aler. The defendant authorized one Rooke to purchase a
00
mare of the plaintiff. After the mare had been purchased
the defendant refused to pay for her, his defence being insuf
ficient memorandum. One of the papers relied on as constiti
uting the memorandum was a letter written by the plaintif f to
Rooke referring to letters which the agen t had written, on
which the lat+,er had made the contract. Held the letters
taken together form a sufficientmemorandum.
Letter Repudiating Conthract.
A letter written for the purpose of repudiating, a
contract may consttitute a memorandum of it if there is an
15
admission of the contract and its sub'stantial terms are
stated. The letter relied on must in itself contain +he
terms of the contract, quantity, quality, price of the godds
etc. or it mist refer to some other paper containing them
in such a way as by its own terms to connect itself with
said paper.
In Bailey V. Sweeting 30 C.P. 150, the letter was
as follows:"In reply to your letter of the Ist. instant I
beg to say that the only parcel of goods selected for ready
money was the chimney-glases amountinp: to 38 lOs, 6d, which
goods I have never received and have long since declined to
have for reasons made known at thn time &c.' Earl J.. in
his opinion said,'The letter in eff'ect says this to the
plaintiff:' I made a bargain with you for the purchase of
chimney glasses but I decline to have them because the car-
rier broke thei/' Now the first part of the letter is unques-
tionable a note or memorandum of the bargain. It contains
the price and all the substance of the contract and there cou
could be no dispute if it had stopped there, it would have be
been a g~ood memgranflum of the contract wi~hin the meaning
of the statute.'
In'Cave V. Hastings 7 Q.B. Div 125, an action for tbe
16
breach of a contract for the hire of a carriage for more than
one year from the date of the agreement, it was prooved that
the plaintiff agreed to let the carriage to the Oiendant.
A memorandum of the t erms of the agreement, was signed by the
plaintiff but not by the defendant. The defendant subse-
quently wrote a letter to the plaintiff desiring to terminate
the agreement, in whi ch he referred to,"our arrangement for
the hire of your carriagle" and,"my monthly payment'. There
was no other arrangement between the parties, to which the
Pxpressions of the defendant could have reference wieclt
the agreement contained in the memor'an'um signed by the plai-
ntiff. Held, that the letter of the defendant was so connec-
*tpd by reference to the document containing the terms of the
contract as to constitute memorandum within the statute of
frauds.
These decisions have been cited approvingly in num -
erous cpses of recent date both in England and America and
this i1 unquestionably the ttled Iaw. 'he iaw hereIasin
numerous other cases seems very inconsistent. Takingj the
above case for an example, if the defendan~t had gene to the
plaint.iff and verbally manifes+ted his intention of" terminat-
ing the co ntract he could not have been held because there
17
would not then have been any signature under his hand, but
having written a leter and made reforence to, our arrange-
mpnt' he is held on his contract there being thena suffici-
ent note of menor andum to satily the statute.
Reference.
In order that collateral papers may hP embodied in
a memorandum so as to make them a part of the contract, the
note or memorandum must clearly peint out the writing eferr-
ed to, so that parol evidence need not be adduced to connect
the writings. The papers should on their face suf ficiently
demonstrate a reference.
Sale by Auction.
An auctioneer is the agent of the vpndor alone until
the bid is krnoc ked off, when he becomes also the Rgent of
the vendee for th' purpose of perfecting the sale, and it is
upon the glound of this dual capacity that the memorandum of
a sale made by him at the time thereof and before the agency
ceases is hinding upon both. Amemorandum made by an auct-
ioneer in order to be vafl, must' have been made contemporane-
ously with the sale, must cutain the names of thn vendor and
18
vendee, a description of the property sold, and the term§ of
the sale, so that, resort to exq-rinsic evidenue will not be
necessary, and if aid is required from the posters or adver-
tisements of the sale they must be referred to in the memor-
andun or they cannot be regarded as a part thereof or used
in evidence. No formality is required. It is not ex-
pected that the terms of the sale will be set Porth with
technical precision.
In Baptist Church V. Bigelow 16 Wend. 28 where a
pew in a church was sold at public auction and the only mem-
orandum of the sale was an entry made by the auctioneer on
a chart or plan of the ;round floor of the church, exhibited
at the sale of the name of the purchaser and the sum bid by
him. Held,the memorandum was not sufficient within thre
requirments of the New York atute although at the time of
the auction, a written or printed advertisement con.aining the
conditions of sale was exhibited and read to the purchpser.
In Talman V. Frankliri Supra, the auctioneer att ach-
ed a letter signed by the owner, which- stated the terms oftth
the sale on a page of his bok; then made the residue of the
entries requisite to "constitute a memorandu' of the contract
and subscribe his n~'ne to it. IHeld, that the letter was to
19
be taken as a part of the memorandum subscribed by the auc-
tioneer and rendered it sufficient within the statute.
Records of Corporations.
The records of a corporation may contain the terms
of a contract sufficient to constitute a memorandum within
the statute. The actions and resolutions of a corporate
body are ordinarily expressdin the minutes recorded by its
secretary or its clerk and subscribed by him in his official
capacity. . Therefore,when there is sufficient evidence of
the terms of a contract and the mi minutes are signed proper-
ly, there is a satisfactory compliance to the sta'ute. For
there is soie note or memorandum subscribed by the party to
be charged thereby.
In Argus Co. V. Albany 55 N.Y. 495 the common council
of the city of Albany adoptd a resolution that the proceed-
ings of the board should be published in. one daily paper to
be designated by the board. The Argus was designated.
Afterwards the comon council awarded the printing to three
other papers. The plaintiff protested. It was held that
the resolution under which ' the plaintiff was appointed city
printer~ created a valid contact in writing under the statute
20
of frauds and entitled the plaintiff to recover the compensa-
tion apTeed upon for the whole period.
Signature.
The note or memorandum must be signed by the parties
to be charged or their,'agents thereunto lawfully authorized.
The question of signature is one of intention, a
question of fact to be detrmined from the other circumstances
of the case. It may be in writing in pencil or ink, or
it miay be printed. It may be in the body of the writing
or~at the beginning or end of it. When the signature is
out of its usual position, other than at the foot of the
instrument, it -hen becomes a question of intention-whether
the signature is a valid oneor not.
In Bennett V. Brumf it 3 C.P. 31 where a party af-
fixed his name to a memorinium on which was engraved a fac-
simile of hi s ordinary signature. Held that the writing was
signed within the statute of frauds.
All that is requirdd is that the iITpression be put
upon the paper by th hand oft the party signing. In each
case whether by pencil , stamp or even initials, it is a pers-.
onal iact~of~the party and to all intents and purposes a
21
signing of the document by him.
Signature by one of the Parties.
The Seventennth section of the statute requires the
memorandum to be signed"by the parties to be charged'. It
will be important here to consider the object of the statute.
It is entitled "An act for the Prevention of Frauds and Per-
juries. Is not the end and object of the statute attain-
ed.by written proof of the obligation of the party to be
charged ? He is the party to be charged with a liability
and he is to be protected against the dangers of fat seeand
oral testimony.
The term parties' in this section is used in con-
nection with the words'to be charged thereby" and ("oes not
necessarily include nor can it te construed to include all
the parties to the contract. It is on the contrary restric-
ted to such only of those parties as are to be legally'te-b#
bound and responsible on the contract.
In Mason V. Decker 72 N.Y. 595, the defendant signed
and delivered to the plaintiff an agreement to bu~y certain
corporate stock upon terms specified and the latter agreed
by parol to sell. Earl J ., said," It is claimed on the
22
part of the deferdant that the plaintiff cannot recover on
the last agreement because it was not mutual and that there
was no consideration expressed in the paper to make the agr-
eement on the part of the defendant binding upon him, for
the reason that there was no agreement to sell. But there
was an ample consideration for the last agreement. The
agreement of the seller to sell need not be in the paper
signed by the purchaser. If the purchaser signs an agree-
ment to buy and delivers it to the seller and he agrees by
parol to sell upon. the terms mentioned in the paper signed
by the purchaser there is a binding contract which can be
enforced against the purchaser.
Parol Evidence
It is quite beyond the scope of the present treatise
to discuss to any great extent the law o+v evidence but a
brief examination will perhaps make the subject more complete.
The question of the admission and rejection of oral evidence
to vary and existing written contract has caused an endless
amount of litigation and yet the question is far from being
settled. The exi stence of a memoranc!um presupposes an ante-
23.,
cedent parol contract, therefore in would be contrary to all
reason to allow oral evidence to be adduced to vary the terms
and defeat the very object which the memorandum was intended
to guard against; Not only is it contrary to the s tatute of
frauds but to the common law before the statute, to add aiy-
thing to an agreement in writing, by parol.
But there are certain cases in which it would be
unjust not to allow parol evidence to be introduced. it is
generally admissible to show that the writing which purports
to be a memor andum of the contract is not a record of any
antecedent parol contract at all; phrol evidence is admissible
to show a mistake in reducing the oral contract to writing;
and as general rule to show a latent ambiguity.
The question of the admission and rejection of par-
ol evidence is discussed at great length in all the works on
evidence and treatises on the statute of frauds. IT -. af-
fords a field of constant litigation and dispute. As the
subject could not be treated with any degree of thoroughness
at this place it has only been alluded to in a brief manner.,

